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Abstract 
This paper concentrates on the effort to trace the limits of the “revolution” which the Cartesian 
“Cogito” brought about in the history of Philosophy, within the context of a broader research that 
begins with Parmenides’ Poem. The research in question concerns the general issue of the correlation 
between thinking (νοεῖν) and being (Εἶναι) to which the “Cogito” itself, as such, refers one. Despite the 
apparent agreement of Parmenides and Descartes on this issue, what this paper aims first of all, is to 
demonstrate the radical difference which in reality exists, regarding this issue, between these two 
philosophers, as well as, more generally, between Descartes and the ancient Greek spirit. From the 
abandonment of this spirit, essentially springs forth the concept of the individual consciousness, which, 
in the future, was to form the basis for the creation of certain new philosophical theories, whose sole 
common element would be the reference to this concept. After Descartes, and all the way towards 
Structuralism, there have, however, also been developed certain theories of another type, which have 
attempted to achieve the re-connection with the ancient conception of νοεῖν and Εἶναι. As examples of 
this effort, this paper denotes the theories of Kant, Hegel and Heidegger. 
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1. Introduction 
The severe criticism exercised by Kant against the Cartesian proposal “Cogito ergo sum” (Note 1) is 
well known. In his criticism, Kant holds that this proposal, which forms the sole basis for an entire 
science, is in fact founded on “absurdities” (Note 2). 
The “Cogito” is nonetheless a milestone in the history of Philosophy, and Descartes himself is 
indisputably the acknowledged father of Modem European Philosophy. What would, therefore, be 
interesting would be to attempt to define the limits of the “revolution” which the “Cogito” has brought 
about in the field of Philosophy, and to define those limits within a broader study of the actual subject 
matter of the relation between thought and existence, to which the “Cogito” itself, as such, refers one.  
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2. Method of Analysis 
Before embarking on such an attempt, it is necessary first to stress that the limits of the revolutionary 
importance of the “Cogito” to Philosophy can only be determined if the “Cogito” is examined in 
comparison to that philosophical view of the world which is not the one that immediately preceded it. 
To compare it with Medieval Philosophy would be tactically incorrect, given that opposition to the 
dogmatic philosophy of the scholastic philosophers and the radical laying of new foundations, 
rationalistic foundations, to the edifice of science and Philosophy, is the declared purpose of Descartes’ 
entire work (Note 3). Any comparisons should be made with even earlier times, specifically in the very 
origins of the history of Philosophy itself, since the meaning of the phrase “Cogito, ergo sum”, which 
lies in the eternally indivisible relation between thought and existence, between νοεῖν and Εἶναι, was 
certainly not first conceived of by Descartes. It had already been both conceived and expressed by the 
pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides in his Poem. Parmenides had confidently asserted: “...τό γάρ αὐτό 
νοεῖν ἐστίν τε και εἶναι” (Note 4), much earlier than Descartes. 
 
3. Main Content 
3.1 The Cartesian “Cogito” and Parmenides’ Poem Fragment III 
Of course, Parmenides’ meaning is much more general than that of Descartes: it does not confine itself 
merely to an awareness of the individual consciousness. It does not refer specifically to the subject, but 
to existence in general, to Being. For Parmenides, only thought, or rather intellection, is capable of 
grasping Being, the true reality of beings. Anything sensed or perceived by the senses is to him neither 
true nor, by extension, actual or real, but merely a false impression. (Note 5) Consequently, since Being 
can be conceived only by thought or intellect, Being is the natural, exclusive, and only possible object 
of thought. 
The truth of this Parmenidean perception of Being as the exclusive object of thought, and in 
consequence, the truth of this clear distinction between the two—between Being on the one hand and 
thought on the other—in no way confutes Parmenides’ parallel view of the existence of an 
inter-dependent relation between thought and Being. Indeed, the relation is such that thought and Being 
become inseparable concepts. It is precisely this close relation that the phrase “… το γάρ αὐτό νοεῖν 
ἐστίν τε και εἶναι” implies. 
Of course, in order to compare Parmenides’ Poem Fragment III with the Cartesian “Cogito”, it is 
necessary at this point to raise the question of what is the true interpretation of this particular fragment. 
Any superficial approach to an interpretation of this fragment could result in nothing more than the 
conclusion that thought and Being are identical. Such a conclusion, however, does not convey the true 
meaning of what Parmenides is saying. Indeed, how could thought and existence, thought and Being, 
be considered identical by Parmenides, since for the pre-Socratic philosopher Being is not merely the 
object, but as mentioned earlier, the only natural and possible object of thought—while anything other 
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than what is mentally conceivable considered as non-existent and merely an illusion? 
Indeed, for Parmenides, Being is conceivable only through thought; and since only Being, or rather the 
Being of the being, “τό ἐόν τοῦ ἐόντος” (Note 6), that which is conceived solely by thought, exists, this 
automatically also becomes the exclusive object of thought, with which, in consequence, thought itself 
cannot be equated. Of course, the question remains regarding the use of the word “αὐτό”. Why does 
Parmenides choose this particular word? In our view, Parmenides chooses it because he wishes to 
emphasize the idea of inter-dependence and indivisible co-existence, and not with a view to indicating 
that the two can be truly equated. 
In other words, what Parmenides is trying to say, is that, since what exists is only the “ἐόν”, and in 
consequence, not an alternation between being and non-being—to the possibility of which any 
subjective opinion could conclude—and since “ἐόν” can be conceived only by thought, thought which 
conceives the “ἐόν” is itself within the “ἐόν”; necessarily exists. It exists and its existence 
automatically means the existence of its content. And the content of thought—that is to say, anything 
real which exists and may be conceived by thought in thought—is precisely the content of the “ἐόν” 
itself. “Νοεῖν” is, as “νοεῖν” of the “Εἶναι”: this, in our view, is the real meaning of Parmenides’ Poem 
Fragment III. And as such, it is evident that it attaches no particular emphasis to the subject. Regardless 
of this fact, however, that which is important for the purposes of this article and which is also very 
evident, is that the correlation between thought and existence is a given fact for Parmenides and that it 
forms the core of his entire philosophical perception. 
What we can, therefore, conclude, is that the origin of this fundamental relationship between thought 
and existence does not in fact begin with the Cartesian “Cogito”. This, however, in no way leads, on the 
other hand, to the conclusion that the Cartesian “Cogito” and Parmenides’ Poem Fragment III are 
saying exactly the same thing. The specific differences between these two conceptions will be 
examined in greater depth at a later stage. At this point, it is sufficient merely to point out this 
substantial difference which can be identified from the outset: that, while in Parmenides’ Poem 
Fragment III there is no identity between “νοεῖν” and “Εἶναι”—as one might erroneously or hastily 
conclude because of the use of the word “αὐτό”—but only eternal co-existence, in contrast, in the 
Cartesian “Cogito”, the two concepts are identical. In this second case, Being and thought certainly can 
be equated, since it is evident that within the general setting into doubt of all things to which Descartes 
is led, and from which the “Cogito” suddenly springs as the sole founded and irrefutable truth, the only 
existence which is considered indisputable, and therefore, the only existence which can be considered 
to exist, is precisely that of thought itself, that of the subject itself who thinks and becomes aware of his 
own existence.  
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3.2 The Kantian Criticism of the Cartesian “Cogito” 
At this point it must be noted that the Parmenidean conception of uninterrupted co-existence, and not of 
absolute identity, between “νοεῖν” and “Εἶναι”, is also that which years later would govern—without 
reference to Parmenides, of course—the very criticism which Kant would direct at the Cartesian 
“Cogito”, given that the Kantian criticism undoubtedly leads, not to a refutation of the Cartesian 
“Cogito”, but to a redefinition of it. Kant makes it clear that the “Cogito” is the foundation for the 
origins of all philosophical contemplation, since the main philosophical problem remains for him also 
the problem of knowledge—that is to say, of the possibility of accordance, within the realms of truth, of 
the content of the mental perception we have of things with things themselves, which as such, are 
outside thought (Note 7). The main philosophical problem which remains for Kant also is the 
possibility of correlation and accordance between thought and existence. However, this correlation is 
set on a new basis, since the terms for such a correlation are no longer merely, on the one hand, 
existence or things in general and, on the other, the psychological experience of subjective 
consciousness, but on the one hand things themselves, and on the other the transcendental subject or the 
actual possibility of the existence of a “transcendental philosophy” (Note 8). 
The change in the meaning of the subject in Kant lends, in fact, a completely new dimension to the 
Cartesian indisputable truth “Cogito, ergo sum”. In the Cartesian perspective, thought is inner energy 
with no outward extension, which incarcerates consciousness in itself, self-defining it and shutting it 
away from the world and from things whose very existence is in doubt. This results, substantially, albeit 
temporarily, in an identification between thought and Being itself. In contrast, in the Kantian approach, 
the totality of objects, whose existence is at no point disputed, is that which consciousness, in fulfilling 
itself, grasps outside and beyond itself, in a transcendental extension, which is in fact that which 
essentially lays the foundations for consciousness itself, for the subject itself, a priori. That which lays 
the foundations, a priori, for the very nature of consciousness is its transcendental relation to the object 
(Note 9). 
3.3 The Meaning of “Νοεῖν” and of “Εἶναι” in Kant, Parmenides and Descartes 
However revolutionary it may appear, both for its own time and for the history of Philosophy in general, 
the philosophy of the “Cogito”—nwhich is otherwise so self-evident—therefore moves within very 
narrow confines, given that the correlation between thought and existence, which the “Cogito” asserts, 
stops at self-awareness, at awareness of the empirical consciousness. The a priori correlation that Kant 
establishes between subject and object breaks the barrier of self-confinement and connects the subject 
with the totality of beings. By extension, the correlation between thought and existence assumes in 
Kant the true dimensions of “νοεῖν” and “Εἶναι”; those dimensions which had originally been 
determined as such in the Parmenidean fragment III, and which Kant succeeds in encountering. 
Parmenides’ meaning is indeed universal, much broader than Descartes’ with regard to “νοεῖν”, and 
thus much closer to that of Kant, despite the initial contrary view which one might form on the matter 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/wjssr               World Journal of Social Science Research                Vol. 4, No. 4, 2017 
 
360 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
by relying superficially on the Cartesian “Cogito”. Parmenides’ “νοεῖν” is the νοεῖν of thought, the act 
of thinking when it conceives the “ἐόν”. It is not the personal νοεῖν, “my” νοεῖν as a thinking being that 
I am—in the exact same way that the Being also in its totality is, as well, for Parmenides, not only the 
“I”, but the totality of the “ἐόν”, within which thought itself has its own place. Besides, in the 
Parmenidean view it could never be possible to separate the “I” from the rest of the Being or from other 
beings, for the very simple reason that for Parmenides there are not many beings, but only “one” (Note 
10). Even thought itself cannot, therefore, have any place of existence other than within this one Being. 
With regard to the Cartesian “Cogito”, on the other hand, it would not even be correct to speak of the 
“ἐόν”, or of the “Εἶναι”. These terms are not representative of the Cartesian conception, given that no 
reference is ever made to them. Reference is made only to “I am”, to individual existence, to “I”. 
Descartes asks “what am I then?”, in order to answer: “a thing which thinks” (Note 11). 
Regardless of the degree of approach, or of the convergences and divergences between the philosophers 
on this fundamental matter of the relation between thought and existence, one thing is certain: that this 
matter does not constitute a revolutionary invention of Descartes, nor does its historical course of 
philosophical research begin with Descartes. It constitutes one of the most fundamental objects of 
philosophical research as a whole. 
3.4 The Relation between Thought and Existence in Plato 
For example, the primary and definitive role that this matter continued to play for Plato also, after 
Parmenides, is well known. For Plato, thought is the nature of the soul, the essence of human existence. 
The soul exists in order to think. Only when it is in a state of slavery is it prevented in its task and finds 
it difficult to think (Note 12). The liberated soul, the soul which is released from the confines of the 
body, is always the thinking soul, the soul which fulfils its true nature—that is to say, that nature which, 
in Plato’s language, the soul possessed pre-empirically (Note 13). 
According to Plato, the relation between thought and existence is not, however, limited to this point 
alone. In Plato, this relation is not merely a relation between the nature or essence of the soul and its 
own existence, but transcends the soul itself, since the object of the essence of the soul—that is, of 
thought—is the Being itself in its totality, over and above each isolated or individual soul or thought. 
The soul, according to Plato, exists in order to think; and when the soul is thinking by itself as such, 
alone and unimpeded, the object of its thoughts is only the very existence as such of the Ideas 
themselves. In other words, the soul exists because it thinks, and that which the soul by itself as such 
thinks about, is that which exists of itself as such and on which depends the existence of all else (Note 
14). 
That which is also important to note is that in the case of Plato the relation between thought and 
existence has a strong immediacy. It is a relation which has been from the outset given as such, which 
is clearly taken as a given thing, and which emerges spontaneously. The immediacy of this relation is as 
great as that of the “Cogito”. There is, however, one basic difference. The immediacy of the “Cogito” 
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arises from the existence of doubt regarding the existence of both the body and all other things in 
general. In contrast, for Plato, the body exists in the same way that all sensible and intelligible things 
exist. By extension, according to the Platonic view, the relation among soul-thought-idea cannot be 
fulfilled in the empiric phase of human existence, except through an arduous and continuous effort to 
lift or release the soul from the bonds of the body and of matter. This immediacy—which implies the 
direct acquisition itself of knowledge, the direct knowledge of the Ideas from the soul, intuition—is the 
immediacy which only the free soul can enjoy. It is, therefore, an immediacy which is itself founded on 
an essential pre-condition, which is not in the least immediate: the pre-condition of the arduous task of 
the continuous ascent of the soul towards that which exists by itself as such. 
In the case of Descartes, there is no such pre-condition, since within the context of general doubt, the 
body is not taken into account. On this basis therefore, it seems that in the Cartesian view—at least on 
the surface—a greater emphasis is placed on the immediacy of the relation between thought and 
existence than that which can be detected in Plato. This immediacy concerns not only the awareness of 
the relation that exists between thought and existence, but also in general the question of how 
knowledge is attained. What generally predominates in Descartes is precisely this direct way of 
attaining knowledge, the intuitive type of knowledge. That which is perceived in his thought clearly 
and distinctively, and only that, is indeed considered by Descartes as truth—that is to say, as truly 
existing (Note 15). 
3.5 The Correlation between Parmenides and Kant Concerning Thought and Existence 
Following this brief reference to Plato and to the correlation between Plato and Descartes with regard 
to the subject matter in which the present article is interested—namely, the relation between thought 
and existence—let us now return to the correlation which we examined specifically earlier, between 
Parmenides and Kant. With regard to this correlation, beyond Descartes, between only Parmenides and 
Kant, it is important to note also how enlightening is the introductory presentation of Parmenides’ 
Poem by Jean Beaufret (Note 16). In this presentation, Beaufret relies heavily on Heideggerian 
phenomenology and in general on the interpretation itself which Heidegger gives to the Poem by 
Parmenides. 
In his work Was heisst Denken?, Heidegger notes that, contrary to the usual interpretation, the 
Parmenidean fragment “... το γάρ αὐτό νοεῖν ἐστίν τε και εἶναι” cannot—as stated earlier—be taken to 
indicate the identification between νοεῖν and Εἶναι. How in fact can νοεῖν and Εἶναι mean the same 
thing? —asks Heidegger. They are in fact different from one another. What is happening—he 
explains—and what Parmenides meant to say, is simply that within this difference, they belong to each 
other, they are inter-dependent. Εἶναι is that which offers to νοεῖν its content, while at the same time 
νοεῖν belongs to Εἶναι, lies within Εἶναι, precisely as that which owes its existence to Εἶναι (Note 
17) .Without a doubt, this, besides, is what is demonstrated by verse 34 of fragment VIII (Note 18). 
Heidegger further stresses that it is the true meaning of the above mentioned fragments of Parmenides’ 
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Poem which determines the fundamental theme of reference of the whole of western European thought, 
since the history of this thought, even in cases in which there is no clear reference to Parmenides’ 
thinking, is in fact no more than a chain of diverse ways of formulating this same theme (Note 19)—the 
most important of which is that which, regardless of the particularities it presents as an entirely 
different metaphysical theory, is proposed by Kant. The common element of approach which, aside 
from the differences, enables Kant to meet Parmenides is precisely that inter-dependence which they 
both see as governing the relation between “νοεῖν” and “Εἶναι”. 
What is especially noteworthy and should be mentioned at this point with regard to this meeting 
between Kant and Parmenides, is also this very fact that the meeting of these two philosophers takes 
place beyond Descartes. In other words, while that which might externally appear to be so and which 
one might expect, would be that this meeting does not concern Kant and Parmenides, but rather 
Descartes and Parmenides, given that the philosophy of the “Cogito” is certainly the philosophy of the 
most direct way of linking existence with thought, the spirit of Descartes is quite different from that of 
Parmenides. 
3.6 The Conceptual Differences between the Cartesian “Cogito” and Parmenides’ Poem Fragment III 
“… το γάρ αὐτό νοεῖν ἐστίν τε και εἶναι” 
“Cogito, ergo sum” 
What is actually the true relation between these two statements? Would it be correct to conclude, or 
even to assume that the Cartesian “Cogito” is at least one of the diverse ways, to which Heidegger 
refers generally, by which the words of Parmenides were reformulated in the history of Philosophy? 
What can be said with certainty is that the Cartesian “Cogito” refers to the specific fragment from 
Parmenides. What is equally certain though, is that in fact the Cartesian “Cogito” has no substantive 
relation with this fragment. 
Parmenides refers to Being; Descartes to the subject. Parmenides uses infinitives (“νοεῖν”, “εἶναι”); 
Descartes uses verbs in the first person (“cogito”, “sum”). Parmenides uses an assured affirmative 
sentence, the aim of which is to make a clear statement and to stress a certainty. Descartes uses a 
sentence in which the terms succeed one another in the form of a conclusion. His sentence is of a 
deductive character. Its aim is to allow a conclusion to be reached, regardless of the fact that this 
conclusion happens at the same time to appear to be tautological and to constitute a truth in itself: 
indeed, the first indisputable truth, for Descartes, and the only one capable of standing up to an utter 
doubting of everything. Despite the use of the words “τό…αὐτό”, Parmenides, on the contrary, does not 
crush the independence of “νοεῖν” and “Εἶναι”, within their inter-dependence. That which Parmenides 
wishes exactly to emphasize is that, on the one hand, this inter-dependence exists, and on the other, that 
it is precisely this inter-dependence which at the same time determines the separate and particular 
nature of both “νοεῖν’’ as “νοεῖν” and “Εἶναι” as “Εἶναι”. 
It is precisely this independence within inter-dependence in Parmenides’ statement that Heidegger 
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perceived and, in his desire to stress the point, interpreted “τό…αὐτό”, not as “the same thing”, but as 
“that which inter-belongs” (Note 20). In other words, Parmenides’ sentence, as an affirmative sentence 
the aim of which is to make a statement, states precisely what it wishes to state concerning both “νοεῖν” 
and “Εἶναι”, maintaining the independence of both terms within their inter-dependence. In contrast, 
Descartes’ use of a deductive sentence, enables us to draw a conclusion only with regard to the subject, 
while not enabling us to draw any separate inference regarding thought. Thought is crushed since it 
becomes one with the subject; or better yet, through the crushing of thought, the only thing which is 
defined is the subject, which is self-defined as a thinking being. 
We can therefore infer that, for Descartes, there is no distinction between thought and existence—apart 
from the fact that thought, as he himself says, is “the essence or the nature” which fulfils existence 
(Note 21) due to the fact that the two phenomena, both thought and existence, converge in the subject, 
which to them is not a third term, but one and the same. Indeed, at no time in the Cartesian theory of 
the “Cogito”, is there any mention of existence in general, or of Being as Being in general, but 
precisely only of the specific subject, of “my ego” and “my” thought. Particularly regarding thought, it 
should also be stressed here that not only is this not put forward in Descartes in the general sense of the 
word, but it does not even exclusively mean the mental functions of the mind by which we are in a 
position to be led to knowledge, as this was understood by both Parmenides and Plato. The act of 
thinking—as Descartes makes clear—does not embrace solely and exclusively the function of the mind, 
but also anything which can be characterized “inside me” as sensation (Note 22). 
Consequently, neither the concept of “νοεῖν” nor that of “Εἶναι”, nor of course the correlation between 
these two concepts, as Parmenides understands them, have anything to do with the Cartesian “Cogito”. 
The greatest difference between these two conceptions lies in the fact that, while thought, in the first 
case, cannot be perceived outside its relation with Being, in the second, it has nothing to do with Being, 
since it is related only to the subject, through which it reaches self-fulfillment. 
Indeed, in the case of Descartes, Being as Being, as a totality, does not exist. Nothing can have 
anything to do with it—and not even thought itself of course—since it does not exist as such. Only the 
subject exists. Not even “the subjects”. The plural is not appropriate, since Descartes sets in doubt the 
existence not only of all objects-phenomena, but also the existence of any existence in general, other 
than that of himself as a thinking subject. For him, Being as a whole is only his own subject. (Note 23) 
On the other hand, of course, it is a fact that the above view lasted for only a short time. Soon 
afterwards, Descartes’ faith in the existence of all other things, both sensible and intelligible, was 
restored. It is well known that the doubting of everything outside himself, even of his own body, was 
merely a method, the aim of which was precisely the regaining of this faith, but this time, on new 
foundations, on an unshakeable basis, on indisputable truths, which would thus transform faith from a 
mere belief, based on generally acknowledged facts or prejudices in accordance with the spirit of the 
Medieval past, into a faith founded in science. It is also a fact that the “Cogito”, the first (Note 24) 
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indisputable truth—despite the fact that it was initially conceived directly as a necessarily immediate 
reality—later took its own place in the chain of thoughts which arises from the idea of the existence of 
God (Note 25), on which this first truth could precisely lay its now established possibility. It is in fact 
this proven existence of God which, at the final stage of the Cartesian theory, lays indeed the 
foundations both for the “Cogito” itself and for the truth of all other existence and 
knowledge—generally enabling Descartes to make Physics a science founded on Metaphysics. 
Certainly that is how things are and certainly the isolated phrase “Cogito, ergo sum” does not constitute 
Descartes’ entire philosophy. Nonetheless, this fact changes nothing concerning the subject matter of 
this paper: that is to say, how Descartes sees the relation between thought and Being. Despite the 
eventual restoration of faith and its foundation in innate, indisputable truths, the fact is that at the 
crucial moment of the definition of thought, thought is not defined in relation to Being as Being, but in 
relation to “ego”, to the individual consciousness, the specific subject. The fact that this definition itself 
is possible and achievable first, first in the series, before any other discovery or finding of truth, 
demonstrates precisely that, for Descartes, thought requires nothing apart from its own self in order to 
exist, to be that which it is—except of course from the subject which possesses it and from which it is 
essentially indistinguishable. And this ultimately is the deeper meaning of the Cartesian doubting. 
However short-lived this doubting may be and however it may be used only as a means, as a method 
which leads us eventually to established knowledge, even to the knowledge of the very existence of 
God, its great importance lies mainly in the fact that it demonstrates or underlines the possibility of the 
“Cogito” to escape from it; or, to put it differently, that it underlines the possibility of thought to exist 
and fulfill itself, its essence, by itself. Its great importance lies in the fact that it shows clearly that the 
essence of thought is not its relation to Being, or, even more simply, the very thought of Being, but on 
the contrary, precisely its own inner self-reliant ability to think innate ideas and truths. This very 
perception of thought as capable of thinking by itself—that is, with no reference to Being—to anything 
outside itself, but wholly from an inner self-reliant ability, is a perception which leads Descartes to a 
different world, a world clearly beyond that of antiquity. 
In other words, however intense the relation between thought and existence may appear in the 
Cartesian “Cogito”—a relation which is not merely familiar, but fundamental to Parmenidean and 
Platonic philosophy and to the ancient Greek philosophical spirit in general—Descartes in fact has no 
connection to this spirit, and his philosophy defines the beginning of a new age in which, in the broad 
sense of the terms of “νοεῖν” and of “Εἶναι”, there is no longer a substantive relation between thought 
and existence. The only relation which remains a relation in Descartes is that very narrow one between 
thought and the subject which fulfils it. 
3.7 Beyond Descartes: Kant, Hegel, Heidegger 
Consequently, if Descartes did bring about a revolution, it was not in the discovery of the direct, 
absolute relation between thought and Being—as it could on a superficial level be understood—but 
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actually in the radical withdrawal of thought from Being. Out of this withdrawal springs the subject, 
which takes the place of Being in an entirely new relation which has no element of comparison with the 
earlier one. With Descartes, the spirit of the ancient philosophy is abandoned precisely because the 
earlier relation between νοεῖν and Εἶναι is abandoned. In the attempt to fill the vacuum which was thus 
created, various new ways were later devised—noteworthy examples of which are the philosophical 
theories of Kant and Hegel (Note 26). 
The most powerful of all the new methods is, in our view, that proposed by Heidegger—primarily 
because Heidegger was the first to revert to the ancient vocabulary, which speaks again precisely of 
“Εἶναι” and “νοεῖν”. Indeed, for Heidegger, that which defines thought is the fact that thought is always 
the thought of the “Being” of the beings. Beings—although not identical to “Being” itself—do not exist 
separately from it, which is concealed within them. In this way, the essence of thought does not lie in 
the discovery of the “Being” of beings beyond beings, but in uncovering, revealing the “Being” 
concealed within them. The task of thought is to grasp the “Being” which is revealed. The nature of the 
task of thought is purely phenomenological and no longer metaphysical. Nonetheless, whether it is 
metaphysical as ancient philosophical thought—and, more precisely, as Plato and Aristotle—conceived 
it, or phenomenological as Heidegger conceived it, what is important is that in both cases—as also of 
course in the case of Parmenides—thought cannot be conceived independently of Being. That which in 
all these cases determines both thought and Being itself is the relation between them. Being is always 
the Being of the beings and thought exists only as thought of the Being of the beings. (Note 27) Of 
course, the question of whether the thought of the Being of the beings manages to express faithfully 
through words that which it conceives, so that what is spoken is precisely what is thought of, and 
whether that which succeeds in entering the realms of thought is not then lost again in the realms of 
what is said, is another matter which remains—as Heidegger put it—a question. (Note 28) It is a 
question which of course had been as such posed much earlier; suffice it to think what was for Plato the 
meaning of language and how important was for him the possibility of the articulation of correct speech 
(speech with knowledge and not without knowledge (Note 29)), and how difficult at the same time he 
considered such a possibility to be (Note 30). 
Despite the similarities among the ancient ontological view and the Heideggerian, regarding the 
concepts of Being and thought, between the ancient philosophers and Heidegger there have been 
philosophers with entirely different views, such as Descartes, who—while appearing to maintain and 
indeed emphasize the relation between Being and thought—in fact abandoned this essential relation, 
with the result of the sudden discovery, or emergence, through this abandonment, of the thinking “ego”, 
the subject, the individual consciousness. 
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3.8 The Emergence of the Individual Consciousness and the New Theories Which Sprang from the 
Cartesian Perception of the “Cogito” 
Of course, at this point the question arises of whether the Cartesian “Cogito” refers to consciousness in 
the real sense indeed of the individual consciousness and uniqueness of the individual, or, on the 
contrary, to the impersonal thought which as such retains the character of universality. What is in fact 
being raised here is a classic question with which commentators of Cartesian rationalism have always 
concerned themselves. Some of these important commentators, such as Hamelin and Brunschvicg 
(Note 31), consider that the “Cogito” does indeed constitute the support basis for the thesis of an 
impersonal thought in which all participate on the universal level, and through which all acquire the 
capability to conceive the truth—precisely because this universal thought, common to all, is the holder 
of innate ideas. 
Despite this fact, however—that is to say, despite the fact that thought, as the holder of innate ideas, has 
the characteristics of universality—it is, in our view, clear at the same time that it is not, nevertheless, 
an impersonal thought which is discovered through the “Cogito”, but on the contrary and primarily that 
thought which appears as inseparable from a specific and empirical subject. 
As pointed out by Geneviève Lewis in her work L’ individualité selon Descartes, in his analysis, 
Descartes never separated thought from an “ego” to which it belongs, given that the “Cogito” is 
expressed in the first person—a first person doubly stressed by the use of the word “ego” itself: “Ego 
cogito, ergo sum”. (Note 32) Besides, when Descartes describes “what is a thing which thinks”, he 
points out that it is “a thing which doubts, which understands, which affirms, which denies, which 
wants, which does not want, which also imagines and which feels”. (Note 33) It is, therefore, a fact that 
the “Cogito” is from the beginning set on an empirical level, on the level of the psychological 
experience of a specific subject, not in the least impersonal and not in the least unconnected with the 
moment in time or with time in general. The definition of thought is clearly outlined in correlation with 
a subject both temporal and empirical: “It is of itself so evident that it is I who doubts, who hears and 
who desires, that it is not necessary here to add anything further in explanation”—Descartes states 
clearly and indisputably. (Note 34) In consequence, that which the Cartesian “Cogito” allows us to 
conclude, is that, while the characteristics as such of thought, as thought, are universal, thought itself is 
not impersonal. Thought is personal: it is “my” thought. It is always the thought of a specific “ego”, the 
thought of a particular individual. 
This sudden emergence of the individual consciousness was to form the basis for the later creation of 
new philosophical theories of common origin, as regards reference to and reliance on what we call “the 
subject”. Without the existence of a direct, or even of any, relation to or continuation from Descartes’ 
philosophy itself, all those philosophies which sprang from the Cartesian perception of the 
“Cogito”—in addition to the separate, dissimilar elements which distinguish each one of them—have 
one thing in common: they no longer deal with Being, but only with human beings, individual 
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existences, subjects. Apart from the clearly existential theories, which are more recent, it can be 
considered that such varied forms of philosophical theory, whose sole common element is the reference 
to the subject, even include the thinking of philosophers such as Spinoza (Note 35) and Leibniz (Note 
36). 
3.9 From the Cartesian “Cogito” to Structuralism 
With the Cartesian revolution of the “Cogito”, the epicentre of philosophical thought shifted from 
Being to the subject. Later it would shift even further: from the subject to the “structure”, or rather, the 
“structures”. The “structures” are always many in number, since they are those which are found beneath 
every kind of action or manifestation, whether individual or social. In Structuralism, the theory of 
“structures”, the subject is lost, since nothing which belongs to it, even its very language (Note 37) and 
all its various relationships (Note 38) and its ideology (Note 39), is in fact its own. All that exists or 
occurs, whether it concerns the subject directly or indirectly, is merely a result, a product: the product 
of certain structures which lie in the background and which by their existence constitute the 
determining cause of any possible appearance, or development, or disappearance of particular 
conditions and circumstances. 
Of course at this point it must be made clear that this particular reference to Structuralism in no way 
aims at correlating this theory with that of Descartes. No such essential or direct correlation can be 
made. 
 
4. Final Concluding Remarks 
What can be achieved, however, vis a vis the history of Philosophy as a whole—and this is put forward 
as a final point of analysis and in the form of a general conclusion for this paper—is some correlation 
of direction, regarding this matter. In other words, since it is to Descartes that we owe the first essential 
discovery of the subject, it is to him also that we can attribute the gradual origins of the progressive 
shifting in the centre of weight, which would eventually lead to the elimination itself of the subject. The 
most important fact of all is that between these two limits, of discovery and elimination, there have 
been attempts to recover and meet pre-Cartesian philosophical thought, attempts to encounter Being 
beyond the subject. 
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Notes 
Note 1. “I think, therefore I am”: R. Descartes, Les principes de la philosophie, part 1, par.7; Discours 
de la méthode, part 4, pp. 147, 148; Méditations, II, pp. 275, 277 Œuvres et Lettres—Bibliothèque de la 
Pléiade, Gallimard, 1953. 
Note 2. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Dialectics, book II, chapter 1, English 
translation by P. Guyer and A. W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 411-458. 
Note 3. R. Descartes, Discours de la méthode, parts 3 and 4. 
Note 4. Parmenides, Poem, fragment III [according to the order of presentation of the fragments 
adopted by Walther Kranz on re-publication (1952) of Diels’ work Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker 
(1912)]. 
Note 5. Ibid., fragments VI and VII. 
Note 6. “Οὐ γάρ ἀποτμήξει το ἐόν τοῦ ἐόντος ἒχεσθαι”: Ibid., fragment IV, line 2. 
Note 7. This concerns the problem of the possibility of existence of a priori knowledge: I. Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason, Prologue to the second edition, Greek translation by A. Yiannaras, Papazisis 
Publications, 1979, BXVII-BXXI, pp. 45-48. 
Note 8. Ibid., Introduction, VII, A 12, p. 97. 
Note 9. This Kantian conception of the consciousness as such can clearly also be considered as 
corresponding with the Husserlian conception of the intended direction of consciousness towards 
objects. 
Note 10. Parmenides, Poem, fr. VIII, line 6: “ἓν, συνεχές”. 
Note 11. “Mais qu’ est-ce donc que je suis? Une chose qui pense”: R. Descartes, Méditations, II, p. 278. 
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Note 12. Plato, Phaedo, 66b-67. 
Note 13. Ibid, 75d-76a -Plato, Phaedrus, 249c-e. 
Note 14. “… ἀλλ’ αὐτῇ καθ’ αὑτήν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτό καθ’ αὑτό εἰλικρινές ἓκαστον 
ἐπιχειροῖ θηρεύειν τῶν ὂντων…”: Plato, Phaedo, 66, “… εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἲσεσθαι, 
ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ και αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτά τά πράγματα”: Ibid., 66d. 
Note 15. R. Descartes, Méditations, IV, p. 309, Discours de la méthode, part 4, p. 151. 
Note 16. Parménide, Le Poème, in a presentation by Jean Beaufret, PUF, 2nd edition, 1984. 
Note 17. M. Heidegger, Qu’ appelle -t- on penser?, French translation by Aloys Becker and Gérard 
Granel, Quadrige/PUF, 1992 edition, pp. 222-223. 
Note 18. “Ταὐτόν δ’ ἐστί νοεῖν τε και οὓνεκεν ἔστι νόημα”: Parmenides, Poem, fr.VIII, line 34. 
Note 19. M. Heidegger, Qu’ appelle -t- on penser?, French translation by Aloys Becker and Gérard 
Granel, Quadrige/PUF, 1992 edition, p. 224. 
Note 20. “ce qui s’ entre-appartient”: M. Heidegger, Qu’ appelle -t- on penser? French translation by 
Aloys Becker and Gérard Granel, Quadrige/PUF, 1992 edition, p. 223. 
Note 21. “Je connus de là que j’ étais une substance dont toute l’ essence ou la nature n’ est que de 
penser”: R. Descartes, Discours de la méthode, part 4, p.148. 
Note 22. “... et c’ est proprement ce qui en moi s’ appelle sentir, et cela, pris ainsi précisément, n’ est 
rien d’ autre chose que penser”: R. Descartes, Méditations, II, p. 279. 
Note 23. “... encore que hors de moi il n’ y eut point d’ autres hommes dans le monde...”: R. Descartes, 
Méditations, III, p. 292. The utter doubting of everything is described characteristically at the 
beginning of Méditation II, pp. 274-275. 
Note 24. “... le premier principe de la philosophie que je cherchais”: R. Descartes, Discours de la 
méthode, part 4, p. 148. 
Note 25. R. Descartes, Méditations, III, p. 294. 
Note 26. Extensive reference is already being made to Kant in this paper. As far as Hegel is concerned, 
it is clear that, in his philosophy, the attempt to correlate “νοεῖν” and “Εἶναι”, not only is a fact, but that 
this fact leads also eventually to the equation between these two concepts—that is to say, to this 
equation which, although at first sight may appear already to have existed in the thinking of 
Parmenides, the latter had not in fact adopted it. Hegel, on the contrary, appears indeed to adopt it, 
since his entire philosophical system precisely identifies history—that which is real—with the Idea 
itself. Thought is identified with existence, since the whole of existence, the whole of historical reality 
is considered as an external manifestation of the Idea, which is fulfilled gradually and dialectically in 
the evolution of history. At no stage of its historically evolutionary completion can the Idea be 
separated from historical reality itself. Each historical moment is a manifestation of the Idea, and 
therefore an identification of the real with the intelligible (G. W. F. Hegel, Leçons sur l’ histoire de la 
philosophie, French translation by J. Gibelin, Gallimard, 1970, vol. I, pp. 119-122). 
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Note 27. This Heideggerian perception of the Being, not as the Being as such, but as the Being of the 
being, refers also precisely to the Parmenidean phrases “το ἐόν τοῦ ἐόντος” (fr. IV) and “τ’ ἐόν ἔμμεναι” 
(fr. VI). The definition of thought as the thought of the Being of the being is based on this view of a 
dual aspect: M. Heidegger, Qu’appelle -t- on penser?, French translation by Aloys Becker and Gérard 
Granel, Quadrige/PUF, 1992 edition, pp. 210-226. 
Note 28. Ibid., p. 226. 
Note 29. The utterance of correct speech is considered so important and imperative, that Plato avers 
that, in order to be guided in speech, man must possess a science capable at all times of indicating to 
him which of the genera are in agreement and can therefore be joined together in speech and which are 
not: “μετ’ ἐπιστήμης τινός ἀναγκαῖον διά τῶν λόγων πορεύεσθαι τον ὀρθῶς μέλλοντα δείξειν ποῖα 
ποίοις συμφωνεῖ τῶν γενῶν και ποῖα ἄλληλα οὐ δέχεται” (Plato, Sophist, 253b-c). 
Note 30. This ability belongs solely and exclusively to the philosopher, since only the philosopher 
possesses the science needed for this purpose, namely dialectics (Ibid., 253d-e). 
Note 31. To Hamelin and Brunschvicg, M. de Corte makes special reference in his work 
“Anthropologie platonicienne et anthropologie aristotelicienne”, Etudes carmélitaines, 1938, pp. 65-66. 
Note 32. G. Lewis, L’ individualité selon Descartes, Vrin, Paris, 1950, p. 98. 
Note 33. “Qu’ est-ce qu’ une chose qui pense? ... une chose qui doute, qui conçoit, qui affirme, qui nie, 
qui veut, qui ne veut pas, qui imagine aussi, et qui sent” : R. Descartes, Méditations, II, p. 278. 
Note 34. “... il est de soi si évident que c’ est moi qui doute, qui entends, et qui désire, qu’ il n’ est pas 
ici besoin de rien ajouter pour l’ expliquer”: Ibid. 
Note 35. According to Spinoza, all men are born without any knowledge of the causes of things, while 
at the same time possessing a constant desire to move towards that which is useful to them, in order to 
succeed in maintaining their existence. The reason for their ignorance, the reason for which the soul or 
thought does not maintain either for itself or for the body any clear and exact knowledge, but only a 
confused and fragmented knowledge, is because this knowledge is determined wholly by external 
factors, by the laws of a universal determinism. In this way, the philosophy of Spinoza is the 
philosophy of human beings, of individuals, of subjects, perceived as a finite and imperfect part of a 
perfect and infinite totality, by which they are determined and on which they depend at all times, and 
who—owing precisely to this dependence—are unable to conceive by themselves through reason the 
totality of causes of which they are the result. All that they are capable of and which characterizes them 
is the tendency to maintain their existence in duration, without ever knowing either what it is which 
impels them to maintain it, nor what is precisely the duration or chain of time (B. Spinoza, Ethics, I, 
App. and II, prop. 29, scol, English translation by A. Boyle, Everyman’s Library, 1986 edition, pp. 
30-36 and 61-62). 
Note 36. In Leibniz we also encounter a philosophy of the many: the philosophy of monads. Of course 
monads are not exactly human beings, subjects, given that they are indivisible unities, which as such do 
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not appear to provide any space for the body. They do however have characteristics in common with 
human beings, given that each monad, despite having the same characteristics as all other monads, 
cannot be identified with any monad other than itself. At the same time, while each monad cannot be 
separated into parts, is not divisible, inside each monad can be found a replication of the whole world; 
that same world which is in fact outside all monads, constituting only the space for the totality of 
monads. In the same way, each human being, through his differentiality and uniqueness, expresses the 
same phenomena, constitutes in his own particular way a microcosm of the universe, and therefore, 
accords proportionately with all others. The very possibility of the existence of the universe relies 
precisely on this proportionately reciprocal concordance of manifestations of the various 
monads-beings (G. W. Leibniz, Discours de Métaphysique, in a presentation by Henri Lestienne, Vrin, 
Paris, 1986 edition, 5 IX, 9 XIV). 
Note 37. For example, F. de Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale, Payot, 1986 edition; R. Jakobson, 
Essais de linguistique générale, Ed. de Minuit, 1963. 
Note 38. For example, C. Lévi-Strauss, Les structures élémentaires de la parenté, Mouton, 1967-C. 
Lévi-Strauss, Anthropologie structurale, Plon., 1958. 
Note 39. For example, M. Foucault, Les mots et les choses, Gallimard, 1966; L. Althusser, Pour Marx, 
Maspéro, 1965. 
 
 
